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Organ Transplantation From The Decc:: 1sed 
Otto E. · G uttentag, M.D. 
Organ transplantation from the 
deceased has proven to be very 
successful. Yet so short is the time 
interval between the cessation of living 
and inoperative deterioration of the 
organs in question that some 
physicians plead for a redefinition of 
death which would lengthen this 
interval. They propose to replace the 
conventional signs , namely: cessation 
of heart beat and respiration, by other, 
earlier evidence. Everyone - certainly 
anyone who has ever taken care of 
young uremic patients - will fully 
·understand this concern; yet is 
updating death the way to resolve 
their difficulties? 
It is the aim of these remarks to 
discuss . briefly some aspe,cts of the 
problem and to make a practical 
recommendation that might serve the 
physicians while rejecting their request 
for a redefinition of death. 
To begin let us clearly recognize 
that it is physicians who have initiated 
this request. No one questions their 
goodwill. Nevertheless, we must ask : 
to what extent are physicians entitled 
to make their demand? Is death 
strictly a medical phenomenon or a 
concept like inflammation or 
malignant growth? Is it derived from 
the experience of physicians alone? 
The answer is obvious. It is not. One 
will readily agree that death is a 
general biological concept; that is to 
say it is valid in but not restricted to 
the area of medicine. Physicians are 
entitled to ask for greater precision in 
defining death from their point of 
view but to contemplate a change in 
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the definition of death , 
otherwise, for reasons 0 1 
i n t e r v e n t ion m a rii 
misunderstanding of the pl 
· concept of death. Indeed, ~ 
invites intellectual dishonest 
even be said to invite murde 
egal or 
medical 
· s t s a 
~ of the 
· request 
It might 
To accuse the physician of either 
would be absurd. As said :fore , no 
one questions their good · ;l or the 
nobility of their purpos Thus it 
would be just as absurd , n ~ ·) explore 
the concept of death in its ationship 
to medicine as it would be • abandon 
indignantly the physicia1: in their 
predicament. There are a i ~~ ast three 
reasons for such exploratic . I) death 
is a highly complex pher: . 1enon, 2) 
. human beings, the biologic organisim 
who are the objects of n. dical care, 
differ from the rest of tb biological 
world in a very significant ;ay, arid 3) 
physician-patient relatiom~ -l p is much 
more complex and variab ; · than that 
between veterinarians or 1, ;'e surgeons 
and the objects of their ca· .-. 
Death, as everyone 11ill agree, 
denotes the irreversible end of a 
biological -structure as ;_ whole. It 
denotes, as probably ev: ryone will 
agree too, a point of re t r•:nce of, and 
not merely in, biology. It ~s , of course, 
quite true that such phrases as "I 
killed the engine" or ·"the wire is 
dead," are widely used. But agairi, one 
(Dr. Guttentag is !he Samuel 
H ahnemann Professor of Medical 
Philosophy, Emeritus, University of 
California School of Medicine, San 
Francisco.) 
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that such language is 
~J:monc.aJ, not literal. 
definitior of death then is clear 
simple when placed within the 
of ontological categories. 
it is inadequate · when a 
-~cre1te, empirical description is 
d of when an organism is dead. 
as need hardly be emphasized, life 
temporal process in actuality and 
of life takes time. Organisms 
not either alive or dead. They also 
be dying, and it is the recognition 
this third state that has prompted 
request of the transplanters. 
beyond the ·scope of these 
to dwell on the assertion that 
are ~ways in the state of dying, 
mamfesting our mortality in all 
"we. ar~,. beginning with growing 
Dymg IS meant here to describe 
state of existence in which certain 
or biological arrangements, 
d for sustaining the existence of 
organisms as a whole, are very 
to complete and irreversible 
of functioning. Considering 
what we know about the heart 
res~iration and their roles jn 
an organism as a whole, it 
at the present time to 
the cessation of any other 
an activity or biological 
t to equal or surpass these 
indicators of the cessation of 
· ng . of the organism as a 
However, as we know now 
of heart beat and respiratio~ 
actually not the ultimate 
tors· Organ · transplantation 
not be possible, if it were so. 
if we can learn anything from 
transplantation in relation to 
it should be to postpone the 
nt of death until the last 
or cell or whatever ~e consider 
the ultimate living subunit has 
The · request of the organ 
transplanters, . therefore, appears to 
backfire. Have we after all reached our 
limits · in obtaining human organs for 
trans?l~ntation short of betraying our 
convictions concerning death? The 
answer, I submit, is no. To 
substantiate it, we shall now examine 
the second problem mentioned above: 
the difference between man and the 
rest of the biological world. 
Death, as stated above, denotes the 
irreversible end of a · biological 
structure as a whole. What is meant by 
"biological structure as a whole"? It is 
a wh?le which we consider adequately 
de~cnbed only as subject (not merely 
object), a center of spontaneity or 
autonomy in contrast to a structural 
whole that needs no such 
characterization, e.g., a machine. 
Biological whole also means that is · a 
whole not at any moment of its 
existence but only in time, similar to a 
non-biological dynamic whole, · e.g. , a 
thundersto.rm. (Since the developing 
· and matunng of a biological whole is 
subject-born a biological whole 
transcends the merely re-active 
dynamism of a non-biological whole 
but that does not concern us in this 
context.) However, for the purpose of 
describing men as a biological whole 
the two above characterizations do not 
suffice. To be sure man is a center of 
spontaneity , someone, not merely . 
soT?et~ing. Surely he is a developing 
bemg like the rest of the objects of our 
~xperience that we call living. But, as 
we all agree , he is not merely a center 
of urges and instincts. He is more. In 
. the period of his greatest autonomy he 
is aware of his status. He "desires to 
know, he wonders why things are as 
they are." He is a conscious (which 
literally means: knowing "with" one's 
self), reflective, responsible being.1 
It i~ at this juncture that man's 
nature in relation to death becomes 
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relevant. For man, one might say, may 
die as man, long before he <lies as a 
biological being. If neurologists or 
other experts tell us that they have 
found some· incontestable signs of a 
person · having irreversibly lost 
consciousness, as indicated, for 
instance, by the absen9e of E.E.G. 
waves over a certain length of time we 
might well agree that such an 
individual as a man has indeed died. 
It is this difference between being 
alive as a human being and being alive 
as a biological structure, and this 
polarity of not being alive as a human 
being and being alive as a biological 
structure that allows us (a) to remain 
intellectually honest, (b) circumvent 
the charge of murder, and (c) serve the 
organ transplanters. As mentioned 
· previously, man as all biological 
structures, is a developing and 
dynamic being. Man's freedom at 
certain stag~s of his being is present 
only potentially or -in limited form -
as in children. It may be present at all 
stages of life only to a limited degree 
- as in the mentally retarded. It may 
be present in distorted form - as the 
severely mentally ill. The law 
recognizes this diversity. Children, the 
mentally retarded , and the severely 
mentally ill do not have the same 
rights in law aS' sane adults. Still the 
law protects ~hese members of the 
human family and their freedom tzy 
the office of guardians ad litem. 
It would seem that this principle of 
inalienable yet flexible protection of 
individual human rights within the 
area of human existence may well be 
extended to the zone in which human 
death and biological life meet. There 
would seem to be no objection to a 
sane adult declaring - if he so desires 
- that no extraordinary treat{Ilent be 
administered him when he is found 
irreversibly unconscious. Irreversible 
unconsciousness certainly permits 
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relinquishment of extn 
means; and thus the principle 
do~nion over his own pers 
these circumstances remains 
Such declaration would be 
value to transplanting phy : 
their desire to obtain human 
time. Whether or not legal 
even legislation· is necessar) 
such declaration legally valic 
a written declaration and der· 
such decision may be 
whether one may be entitk 
fiduciaries ad mortem -
and adapt the above menti, 
rdinary 
·f man's 
l under 
violate. 
1f great 
~ ians in 
rgans in 
;tion or 
o make 
..vhether 
:ition of 
equired, 
to elect 
modify 
·ed legal 
term to this purpose - e minor 
tech~calities. What matters . re is our 
loyalty to man as a center ~ freedom 
and our obligation to n ect this 
freedom in interhuman rela ns. Even 
after death in the eyes o r 
does not fall to the lev· 
animal but retains his 
mortalis deus as testified h 
of burial? •3 
aw, man 
of dead 
~ atus of 
his right 
It took the construction , - the atom 
bomb to make the physicis recogruze 
sin (to use the h ysicist 
Oppenheimer's words). May we 
physicians pause and consL r what we 
intend to do in interhunL _. relations 
lest we commit even grea·· . :- sins. Let 
us, of course, not .. )rget the 
physicians's inalienable J eedom to 
explore all paths toward th ~ benefit of 
his patients; but let us alsc not forget 
every human being's malienable 
freedom to · resist tn.!nipulation. 
Thorough awareness oC both is 
demanded of us. 
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Caring . 
Robert E. Fredericks, M.D., F.A.C.P. 
Two common words in our language 
"for" and ~'about". They are 
ally thought · of as simple 
prepositions. An important 
in our profession is the word 
. But it's amazing wh~t a 
ence in meaning results, 
IIJeilCIUtll: on which of the simple 
follows that word -
The difference is not just in 
but much more important, a 
ne1:enc::e in loving. 
been wracking my brain for 
trying to find a way that I can 
to you about lovirig. I have been 
to use all the obvious cliches. 
fought the annoying tendency 
philosophize and theorize about 
I have been concerned that it 
seem that I am trying to deliver 
to you, who are probably 
practitioners both of 
and of loving than I am. 
it occurred to me that perhaps 
share some of the problems 
which I have . struggled in this 
area and find out how we can 
more about our patients 
just caring for them. 
Fredericks, a graduate of 
Medical School, is Assistant 
of Hematology, University 
• wrui£)mJin. (Los Angeles) Medical 
Where do we start? To whom do we 
look? The theologians and 
philosophers? The psychiatrists and 
psychologists? Yes,they can all help, 
b~t their views are often impersonal or 
sometimes directly in conflict. How 
about the poets and novelists? Perhaps 
they tell us more, or at least they 
move us more emotionally. ·Where else 
to look? Perhaps to Lincoln, Ghandi, 
Schweitzer? All great and loving men 
- but for us, the man who cared most 
arid did most ABOUT others was 
certainly the Carpenter of Nazareth. 
It's of special interest to us that He has 
so often been credited with being the 
"Great Physician", not because of his 
advanced medical knowledge or 
scientific skill, but in praise of his 
loving care ABOUT all of his 
"patients". 
Like you, I am a Christian, and 
that's important. But in practice -and 
daily preoccupation, I seem to 
emphasize my role as doctor far above · 
my role as Christian. I'm beginning t~ 
realize more deeply how it matters to 
me as a doctor and how important it is 
for my patients that I re-order these 
priorities. I need to do as much caring 
ABOUT as I have done caring/or. 
A friend of mine loves to introduce 
into any discussion of Christ, the good 
humor and broadminded humanity of 
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